But the healthy human understanding and the natural feeling of rude and barbarous Turks， when taken as a standard， result in shocking principles.
When we speak of healthy human understanding， however， of natural feelings， we always have before our eyes a cultured mind； and those who make the healthy human reason， the natural knowledge， the immediate feelings and inspirations found in themselves， into a rule and standard， do not know that when religion， morality， and rectitude are discovered to be present in the human breast， this is due to culture and education， which are the first to make such principles into natural feelings. Here natural feelings and the healthy human understanding are thus made the principle； and much may be recognized as coming under these heads. This then is the form taken by Philosophy in the eighteenth century. Taken as a whole， three points of view have to be considered； in the first place， Hume must be regarded on his own account， then the Scottish， and， thirdly， the French philosophy. Hume is a sceptic； the Scottish philosophy opposes the scepticism of Hume， the French philosophy has in the "enlightenment" of Germany (by which expression is indicated that form of German philosophy which is not Wolffian metaphysics)an appendage of a feebler form. Since from the metaphysical God we can make no further progress in the concrete， Locke grounds his content on experience. But that empiricism leads thought to no fixed standpoint， Hume demonstrates by denying every universal； the Scottish philosophers， on the contrary， undoubtedly maintain universal propositions and truths， but not through thought. Hence in empiricism itself the fixed standpoint has now to be adopted； thus the French find the universal in the actuality which they call réalité. They do not， however， find its content in and from thought， but as living substance， as nature and matter. All this is a further working out of reflecting empiricism， and some more details respecting it must still be given.
A. Idealism and Scepticism Thought generally is ******， universal self-identity， but in the form of negative movement， whereby the determinate abrogates itself. This movement of Being-for-self is now an essential moment of thought， while hitherto it was outside it； and thus grasping itself as movement in itself， thought is self-consciousness - at first indeed formal， as individual self-consciousness. Such a form it has in scepticism， but this distinction marks it off from the older scepticism， that now the certainty of reality is made the starting point. With the ancients， on the contrary， scepticism is the return into individual consciousness in such a way that to it this consciousness is not the truth， in other words that scepticism does not give expression to the results arrived at， and attains no positive significance. But since in the modern world this absolute substantiality， this unity of implicitude and self-consciousness is fundamental - that is， this faith in reality generally - scepticism has here the form of idealism， i.e.， of expressing self-consciousness or certainty of self as all reality and truth. The crudest form of this idealism is when self-consciousness， as individual or formal， does not proceed further than to say： All objects are our conceptions. We find this subjective idealism in Berkeley， (1)and another form of the same in Hume.
1. Berkeley 2. Hume B. Scottish Philosophy In Scotland quite another school of thought developed， and the Scotch are the foremost of Hume's opponents； in German philosophy， on the other hand， we have to recognize in Kant another opposing force to that of Hume. To the Scottish school many philosophers belong； English philosophy is now restricted to Edinburgh and Glasgow， in which places a number of professors belonging to this school succeeded one another. To the scepticism of Hume they oppose an inward independent source of truth for all that pertains to religion and morality.
This coincides with Kant， who also maintains an inward source or spring as against external perception； but in the case of Kant this has quite another form than that which it possesses with the Scottish philosophers. To them this inward independent source is not thought or reason as such， for the content which comes to pass from this inwardness is concrete in its nature， and likewise demands for itself the external matter of experience. It consists of popular principles， which on the one hand are opposed to the externality of the sources of knowledge， and， on the other， to metaphysics as such， to abstract thought or reasoning on its own account. This sort of reasoning understanding applied itself to ethics and to politics - sciences which have been much developed by German， French， and above all by Scottish philosophers (supra， p. 320)； they regarded morality as cultured men would， and sought to bring moral duties under a principle.
