Mao Tse-tung, 113
Marginal contract rent curve, 17-19
Marginal crops: defined, 134; output responses of, 139-54, 150n; of internal land margin, 142-45; of interplanting margin, 145-49, of seasonal margin, 149-54
Marginal inequalities, 64-66. See also Disguised unemployment; Dual economy; Increased farming intensity60. See also Contractual arrangements; Share contract
Contractual arrangements, 159; risk distribution in, 63-87 passim; transaction costs, 63-87 passim; choice of, 64, 69, 71, 161; patterns of, 66-67; evidence supporting hypothesis, 72-87 passim; effect of inflation on, 73-74; transfer of rights in, 85; effects of legal arrangements on, 86-87
Contractual renegotiation, 84-85
Contractual terms: in share contract, 3, 16-29, 52-55; government intervention in, under Taiwan land reform, 7; in fixed-rent contract, 27; neglected in tax-equivalent analysis, 31; in metayage, 40-41; in wage contract, 42-43; sample contracts, 72-73, 76-77
Cournot approach, 117n
Crop area, 150n; defined, 130-32; effect of share restriction on, 132-57; of citronella, 142; of interplanting crops, 146; of vegetables, 150
Crop choice: stipulated in share contract, 23-28, 76-77; patterns of, 129-57
Cucumbers, 146
Cultivated land. See Land area"Customs": and rental shares, 39-48; and famine adjustments, 74-76
Demsetz, Harold, 65n
Density of planting, 132-57 passim
Dien: in prereform land law, 11;defined, 12 Disguised unemployment, 160,165-69
Dismissal, 80, 83, 95, 97-98, 120 Distribution of income. See Income distribution Double cropping, 136-37 Dry fields: crop area increase in, 136-37; and yield increase under share restriction, 138; frequency of tenancy in, 139; effect of rental restriction on, 141; rental percentage of, 141 Dual economy, 160, 165-69 Duration of lease contracts: choice of, 79-85; distribution of, 80; with zero transaction cost, 81, 85
Efficiency: in Smith's time, 33; and transaction cost, 64-66, 87; with legal arrangements, 86-87; under Taiwan land reform, 116, 156-57, 160; and investment, 128; economic, 159. See also Pareto condition
Eggplants, 146
Elasticity of output, 21,26
Enforcement cost: reduced by competition, 63-68; varies with lease duration, 83-85; of Farm Rent Reduction Act, 67n, 68n, 70n, 113. See also Transaction cost
Escape clause, 74-76
Exclusivity of right: and limited authority, l0n; to use resource, 115-17. See also Property rights
Exploitation: in tenancy, 8, 159; claimed by Mao Tse-tung, 113
External land margin, 130"Famine," 74
Farmers (tax collectors in England) 70n
Farm Rent Reduction Act of 1951, 92, 110, 112, 114; and minimum lease period, 94; enforcement cost of, 113
Fertilizers, 123-25
Fixed rent: compared with share contract, 27; frequency of in Asian agriculture, 66; transaction costs of, 67; sample contracts of, 72-73; escape clause and risk dispersion with, 74-76; lease duration with, 84
Fixed tenure, 161
Freehold, 34
Green manure, 124-25, 148n Gross crop value, 118, 142n, 154 Ground space, 146"Harvest loss," 97
Heady, Earl O., 47-48, 60n
Higgs, Henry, 44
Horticulture: area harvested in, 132;effect of share restriction on, 154 Hwalien, 139, 141, 142
Improvements in land. See
Investment Income distribution: redistribution by land reform, 7; redistribution by
Marginal product of labor: equals wage rate, 21; equals marginal tenant cost, 54-55; on commonly owned resource, 117, 168; and theories of disguised unemployment and dual economy, 165-69. See also Increased farming intensity
Marginal product of land: reduced to zero, 17, 54n; in share contract, 21, 25; under share restriction, 104-8, 156-57
Marginal product of nonland inputs: under share restriction, 5, 133-35, 156-57. See also Increased farming intensity
Marshall, Alfred, 42-51
Maximization, of wealth or utility: in share contract, 16-29; opposed to custom, 48; tax-equivalent approach to, 48; and hypothesis of contractual choice, 69
Maxwell, Constantia, 35, 70, 76
Metayage: Smith on, 32; Young on, 34; Maxwell on, 35; Bentham-Edwards on, 35; Jones on, 36-38; Sismondi on, 38; English authorities on, 38-39; McCulloch on, 39n; and custom, 39-41; Mill on, 41-42
Mill, John Stuart, 36; on rent as production cost, 24n, 42n; on share tenancy, 38-42; on custom, 39, 40; on "improvements," 39-40
Minimum rent and wages, 76
Mortgage, 11
Negotiation cost, 63, 67, 75, 83-85.
See also Transaction cost Neoclassical view on share tenancy,42-51
Nonland inputs: ratio to land, 16-28, 57-58, 61; Heady's argument on, 47; and dispersion of tenant inputs, 53-54; labor-land ratio in different forms of tenure, 60; as compensating payment, 90, 96; legally restricted, 92-93, 94; diminishing returns to, 105, 107; under rental share restriction, 108-9
Offsetting contractual rearrangements 88-99; defined, 89; and compensating payments, 89-90; and tenure rearrangements, 90-91; effect on resource value, 91
Ordinary lease, 12-15
Oriental pickling melon, 146
Paddy fields, 168; increase in crop area of, 136-37; increase in yield of, 138; frequency of tenancy of, 139; rental percentage of, 141; effect of share restriction on, 141
Pareto condition, 55, 65, 86, 159. See also Efficiency
Penghu, 141, 142n
Perpetual lease: yungtien, 11-12; frequency in China, 80; observations on, 82-83. See also Freehold
Philippines, land reform in, 5n, 9
Piece-rate contract, 67n, 68n
Portfolio selection, 63
Potatoes, 146
Perfectures, impact of share restrictions on, 139-42
Present value: maximization of, 23, 79; of land, 24n
